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COMMENT
PRETRIAL DETENTION OF WITNESSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Restrictions on the individual liberty of persons suspected of com-
mitting no wrong should always be open to examination in order to
determine whether their justifications are actually sufficient to warrant
the deprivation imposed.' Every state and the federal government
authorize procedures that can severely restrict the liberty of persons
who are needed as witnesses 2 in criminal proceedings. Although he
may be suspected of no criminal act,3 a witness who is needed in such
a proceeding may be subject to restrictions ranging from a duty to
appear in answer to a subpoena 4 to the posting of bond to assure his
appearance or imprisonment for failure to do so.5 A very few jurisdic-
tions allow detention only if it is impossible for the witness to testify
by deposition, but even in these cases the witness may be held for limited
periods of time for questioning.6 In addition, the witness's freedom of
travel may be limited to a certain community or jurisdiction.
Implicitly the requirement of bail or detention assumes, either ex-
pressly or covertly, that a subpoena backed by the threat of imprison-
ment for contempt is inadequate to guarantee the attendance of a wit-
ness at trial. Whether this contempt power is in fact inadequate; when
it may properly be determined to be so; and what procedure will best
balance the state's need with the witness's freedom are all questions that
have not been fully explored. It is the position of this Comment that
the requirement of bail or detention is unnecessary and ineffective in the
vast majority of cases; that there are less restrictive alternatives open to
the state which should be explored and utilized; that only a very limited
number of detention procedures can meet constitutional standards of
' For a discussion of civil actions in which an individual is deprived of freedom
without having committed a wrong, see Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On, the
Justifications for Civil Cnunitinent, 117 U. PA. L. Rxv. 75 (1968) ; Note, Due
Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil Conzmitinent and
Release, 34 U. CI. L. REv. 633 (1967).
2The term "witness" is used in this Comment to mean a "person who happens
to know something on the matter in issue." 8 J. WIGmORE, EVIDJENcE § 2190, at 63
(McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WiGmom].
3 Although an individual may be held as both a defendant and a material witness,
cf., e.g., People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of New York, 203 N.Y. 173, 96
N.E.2d 763 (1951), this Comment is limited to consideration of the permissible
restrictions on liberty that flow solely from the latter status.
4 See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). See generally 97
C.J.S. Witnesses §4 (1957).
-5 For a statutory survey see Comment, Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex
(The Plight of the Detained Material Witness), 7 CATH. U.L. REv. 37, 38 n.7 (1957).
6 See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3149 (Supp. III, 1968).
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substantive and procedural due process; ' and finally, that the fairer
procedures are those which severely limit jailing of witnesses and im-
pose penalties only for actual disobedience.8 The areas of concern which
will be considered in order to evaluate the restrictions imposed upon
witnesses will include: (1) the relevant interests involved and the pur-
pose served by detention of witnesses; (2) the available procedures for
securing the attendance of witnesses other than restrictions on liberty
in advance of misbehavior; (3) the current state laws securing the at-
tendance of witnesses through procedures that restrict the liberty of the
witness in advance of misbehavior; (4) the constitutionality of these
methods; and (5) the use of detention of witnesses as a subterfuge for
detention of a suspect without probable cause for arrest or in order to
avoid affording the constitutional procedures given a person accused
of a crime.
During the last few years there has been a revolutionary change
in the attitude of courts toward the rights of criminal defendants. At
the same time, there has been no judicial reconsideration and little care-
ful study " of the power that a state can exert over a witness," of the
7 See text accompanying notes 126-97 infra.
8 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §109-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
Illinois has eliminated the requirement of money bail for witnesses and requires
only a written undertaking. For the text, see note 47 infra.
The Supreme Court has vigorously persisted in making the fourth, fifth,
and sixth amendments applicable to the states by incorporation into the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by jury
for "serious crimes"); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (right to counsel
at lineup) ; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process
in criminal trial) ; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy
trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutor cannot comment on
failure of accused to testify); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to
confrontation) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right against self-incrimina-
tion) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in noncapital
offenses) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of illegally obtained evi-
dence). At the same time these rights have been expanded and broadened. See, e.g.,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967) ; Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) ; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10 The subject has received some attention in student works. Comment, Cessante
Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex (The Plight of the Detained Material Witness),
7 CATH. U.L. REV. 37 (1958); Comment, Material Witnesses in Criminal Proceed-
ings: Securing and Assuring Their Attendance, 18 Mo. L. RExv. 38 (1953) ; Comment,
Witnesses-Imprisonment of the Material Witness for Failure To Give Bond, 40
Nm. L. REv. 503 (1961); Comment, Confining Material Witnesses in Criminal
Cases, 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 164 (1963) ; Comment, 5 S'n.Acusu L. Rv. 213 (1954).
For a discussion of the British system of detention of witnesses see Samuels, Criminal
Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965, 115 L.J. 539 (1965).
31 One of the reasons that there has been no new law on the rights of witnesses
is the small amount of actual litigation in the area. Detained witnesses are usually
indigent and, therefore, unable to retain a lawyer to attack their detention. And what
has been said about the illegally detained suspect is even more true in the case of a
witness committed to jail for failure to post bail: "As a practical matter, a writ of
habeas corpus is available to a suspect only if he has counsel. Thus, except in the
case of the professional criminal, whose counsel is likely to know when his arrest
takes place, access to a writ is dependent upon access to counsel. . . . The indigent
suspect is not likely to resort to the writ, because he knows he cannot afford to
retain counsel." W. LAFAvE, ARRESr: THE DEcisioN To TAxE A SusPEcT INTO
CUSTODY 407 (1965).
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rationale of that power, or of the procedural limitations on its exercise.
Some state legislatures have, however, recently sought to balance the
rights of witnesses with those of the state when revising codes of crimi-
nal procedure, and others may do the same when they move to conform
criminal procedures to the standards set for defendants by the Supreme
Court .
In striking the balance to determine what can lawfully be done to
curtail the freedom of an individual merely because he may have infor-
mation needed by the state to perform its prosecutorial functions and to
give the accused a constitutionally fair trial, 3 three competing interests
must be examined.
1. One interest is that of the state in enforcing its criminal law.
In order to perform its prosecutorial functions, the state needs to have
information for its investigations,' 4  and witnesses available for
The development of traditional exclusionary rules, culminating in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), has placed suspects in a better position in this regard
than witnesses. The threat of exclusion of a confession will tend to assure that counsel
is available to suspects, unless the police are for some reason willing to forego use
of the confession or its fruits.
No similar protection, apparently, has been afforded witnesses. People v. Portelli,
15 N.Y.2d 235, 205 N.E.2d 857, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1965), a pre-Miranda decision,
refused to exclude the testimony of a witness beaten, kicked, and burned with lighted
cigarettes by the police. Although much of the language in Miranda is apparently
directed at any type of custodial interrogation-e.g., 384 U.S. at 446-47, 471 ("we hold
that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the
right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation")
-the only rule laid down was that the "warnings required and the waiver necessary
in accordance with our opinion today are . . .prerequisites to the admissibility of any
statement made by a defendant." Id. at 476 (emphasis added). Furthermore, most
of the discussion was framed in terms of protection of the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination. In any event, no decision has been found applying Miranda
to a person detained solely as a material witness.
12 The PROPOSED N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW §§ 330.10-.70 (Thompson
1968) includes new provisions regarding material witnesses. The bill was submitted
to the 1968 Legislature by the Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law
and Criminal Code "for study purposes," and was not acted upon by the Legislature.
After further revision a final draft has been submitted for passage at the 1969 session
of the Legislature. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, at 1, col. 4, 56, cols. 3-6;
TEMPORARY Comm'N ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE, PROPOSED
N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW (Thompson 1968) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. PRO-
POSED CRuM. CODE].
Pennsylvania has revised its criminal procedure, including the provisions per-
taining to material witnesses. PA. R. CRIm. P. 4014. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 109-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 47 (1968).
13 The state also has an interest in giving civil litigants the opportunity to
settle disputes, and, thus, provides parties with compulsory process to secure witnesses.
Since there is no intrusion into the witness's liberty beyond the duty to answer a
subpoena (and punishment for disobedience), there is no question of restrictions
prior to misbehavior.
14 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966), the court referred, in
dictum, to an investigatory function of the police: "General on-the-scene questioning
as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-
finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for
individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement."
Although the on-the-scene or "field" interrogation no doubt restricts the liberty of
an innocent person because he is a witness, the subject has come to the Supreme
Court in terms of "suspects" in the "stop and frisk" cases. See Sibron v. New York,
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trial.'0 However, the state has an interest in encouraging persons to
come forward with information relevant to the investigation and prose-
cution of crime. Whatever policy the state takes toward witnesses may
influence citizens in performing this duty. If these procedures impose
heavy burdens on potential witnesses, such as extended periods of de-
tention or high bail, such witnesses may be discouraged from coming
forward. On the other hand, the state may hope to counteract the
known reluctance of witnesses to become involved by taking strong
measures to assure their appearance at trial once they have been found.
2. A competing interest is that of the witness, an individual who
has committed no wrong, to have maximum freedom of movement."0
3. Finally, a criminal defendant has at least two interests. He is
guaranteed the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." 17 Although the situation may vary depending on the nature
of a particular witness, the defendant may have an interest in having
prosecution witnesses present at trial so that he may cross-examine and
challenge their veracity rather than allowing the state to introduce their
testimony in hearsay form. In this area the defendant's interest in
having the witness present at trial may coalesce with that of the state,
since infringement of the defendant's right will result in the reversal
of convictions obtained.'" Greater freedom afforded a witness may
thereby limit the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine a witness and
have his demeanor considered by the jury. Thus, any solution obtained
must balance the defendant's right of confrontation and the witness's
right to freedom. It should be noted, however, that in any situation
in which the prosecution is not allowed to use indirect testimony
of prosecution witnesses, the defendant will have no interest in having
the witness available. In fact, in such a situation, he will desire the
absence of the incriminating witness, particularly if the witness is
crucial to the establishment of a prima facie case against him. The
defendant may also require that witnesses be available in his defense.
But these witnesses may not always be cooperative. The sixth amend-
392 U.S. 40 (1968) ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For an extensive discussion of
these cases see LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron,
Peters and Beyond, 67 MfICH. L. REV. 39 (1968).
15 See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
16 Freedom to travel both within the United States and abroad is part of the
liberty protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) ; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) ; Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941). See also, New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
17 U. S. CoNsT. amend VI, made applicable to the state by the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
IS See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), held to be retroactive in Berger v.
California, 89 S. Ct. 540 (1969).
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ment recognizes the importance of this interest by giving the accused
the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor." '" Just how far the right extends, however, is unclear. Most
states do not grant statutory authority to the defendant to serve wit-
nesses,20 and some courts have held that the right to subpoena does not
include extraterritorial service." Whether the defendant's ability to
compel a witness to attend trial should be the same as that of the
prosecution 2 depends on a balance of the relative interests of all three
parties.
II. THE WITNEss's DUTY TO TESTIFY
Before examining the most serious deprivation of liberty with
which this Comment is concerned-involuntary confinement prior to
any violation of law-it is necessary to examine the scope of the duty
of a witness to testify and the general process by which the state can
deter neglect of that duty. For it is in the law recognizing the individ-
ual's duty to testify that one finds the basis for all statements assuming
the constitutionality of restrictions on a witness.23
The duty of an individual to appear as a witness and testify to
matters within his knowledge when summoned by a judicial or legisla-
19 U.S. CONsT. amend VI. For a discussion of the historical evolution of com-
pulsory process for the defendant see 8 WIGMORE § 2190. See also Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), which made the right binding upon the states.
Nevertheless, the defendant's right is far from absolute. See, e.g., Maguire v.
United States, 396 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1968) : "The Sixth Amendment does not
require that the government be successful in trying to subpoena witnesses-all that
is required is that the process issue and the Marshal exercise due diligence in a
good faith attempt to secure service of process" (citations omitted). See also Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), which required a "good-faith effort," id. at 725, to
secure the presence of out-of-state prosecution witnesses. Startlingly, state courts
have not interpreted this decision as requiring a similar effort when the witnesses
are sought solely by the defense. People v. Cavanaugh, 444 P.2d 110, 112-13, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 438, 441 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Dirring, 238 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Mass. 1968)
(no mention of Barber in opinion). Despite the clear language in each case, however,
the results could be explained on other grounds. In Cavanaugh, the state did produce
2 of 11 requested alibi witnesses, the trial judge ruled that the testimony of the others
would be merely cumulative, and their responses to written interrogatories were
read at trial. 444 P.2d at 113-14, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 442-44. In Dirring, the request
for production of 32 witnesses from various states was not made until the 5th day
of trial, and counsel, when questioned, stated that the testimony "would be primarily
hearsay." 238 N.E.2d at 512.
20 See note 42 infra.
21 People v. Cavanaugh, 444 P.2d 110, 70 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1968) ; Commonwealth
v. Dirring, 238 N.E.2d 508 (Mass. 1968). Although the UNIFORM Acr TO SECURE
THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNEssEs FROM WITHOUT THE STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
[hereinafter cited as UNIFORM WITNESS AcT] has been enacted in 45 states, the
District of Columbia, the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, 9 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. 50 (Supp. 1967), if the state cases cited above were followed literally,
it could be used exclusively for the production of prosecution witnesses.
22 For a discussion of the inequality between defense and prosecution because of
the power of the state to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution without affording
similar privileges to the defense, see Note, Right of the Criminal Defendant to the
Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 COLUM. L. RPv. 953 (1967).
23 See, e.g., New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 7 (1959).
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tive tribunal is clearly established in our law.24 This undoubtedly im-
poses a burden on individual freedom that may require a sacrifice of
time or privacy,2" but such a burden is inevitable in a system of law
requiring direct testimony of witnesses.2" Both common law 27 and
state statutory law recognize the duty, which was articulated and justi-
fied by the Supreme Court in Blair v. United States.
28
[I]t is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony and the
attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are
public duties which every person within the jurisdiction of the
government is bound to perform upon being properly sum-
moned, and for performance of which he is entitled to no fur-
ther compensation than that which the statutes provide. The
personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary contri-
bution of the individual to the welfare of the public. The
duty, so onerous at times, yet so necessary to the administra-
tion of justice according to the forms and modes established
in our system of government . . . is subject to mitigation
[only] in exceptional circumstances . *...29
When properly served, a person can be required to come to court
to testify even if it is inconvenient. In Blackmer v. United States,30
the Supreme Court upheld the contempt conviction of Blackmer for his
failure to appear and testify at a criminal trial in the District of
Columbia after being served with a subpoena in France. Subject only
to the specific evidentiary privileges and the right against self-incrimi-
24 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) ; Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273 (1919) (grand jury). See generally 8 WIGMORE §§2190-93; 97 CJ.S.
Witnesses § 2 (1957). The duty to testify applies to civil as well as criminal cases.
See, e.g., Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897).
2 5 See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE § 2192, at 72.
26 Professor Wigmore finds the duty necessitated by "justice as an institution
and . . . law and order as indispensable elements of civilized life." Id. 73. "It is a
duty not to be grudged or evaded. Whoever is impelled to evade or to resent it
should retire from the society of organized and civilized communities, and become
a hermit." Id. 72.
27 The use of compulsion to force a witness to testify was for a long time
unknown to the common law. Sir William Holdsworth notes, "As late as 1455 it was
said in argument that 'no one can compel another to swear with him.'" 9 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 180 (1926), quoting Y. B. Hil. 33 Hen. 6,
p1. 23 (1455). But Chancery had developed the subpoena in the 14th century, and
by the 16th it was being freely borrowed by the King's Council and the common
law courts. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 184-85. The Act of 1562-63, 5 Eliz. 1, c. 9,
§ 12, subjected a witness in a civil case who failed to appear and testify to a penalty
and made him liable to suit by the party injured by his default. See generally
8 WGMORE § 2190. In the United States, the duty is as old as the country: "By the
first Judiciary Act [Judiciary Act of i789, c. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 88, the] duty to appear
and testify was recognized." Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280 (1919).
28250 U.S. 273 (1919).
29Id. at 281 (citations omitted).
30 284 U.S. 421 (1932)
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nation,"' an individual can be compelled to tell whatever he knows and
to produce documents. 2
The general process used to compel the attendance of a witness is
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum. The sanction behind the
subpoena is the power of the court to punish improper failure to appear
in response as contempt of court. 83 In addition to the possibility of a
contempt citation, an individual who breaches his duty to testify in re-
sponse to a subpoena may be subject to a civil suit by the party who has
been harmed by the breach.34
When a witness fails to appear in response to a subpoena, a court
in its discretion may order his "attachment," that is, arrest him to com-
pel his attendance.35 But where it appears that the subpoena will not
suffice to assure attendance, the court may order the arrest of the wit-
ness without issuing any subpoena at all. It is this power, the existence
of which was recognized in Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunning-
ham, 6 that subjects the witness to a particularly serious deprivation
31 In addition to the right against self-incrimination, U.S. CoNsT. amend V, the
witness need not testify if he can invoke the evidentiary priviliges. See, e.g.,
C. McCoRmicic EVIDENCE §§82-90 (husband-wife), 101-08 (doctor-patient), 91-100
(attorney-client) (1954). Generally, however, the privileges excuse only testimony;
the witness must still appear to claim the privilege. See 8 WiGmORE § 2197. Even
the privilege against self-incrimination will not excuse the witness from testifying
if he is granted immunity from prosecution. See, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
32 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 372 (1911).
3A contempt charge requires ability to comply. Bickley v. Commonwealth,
25 Ky. (2 J.J. Mar.) 572, 574 (1829) discussed in text at note 93 infra. See gen-
erally 17 C. J. S. Contempt § 19, (1963).
34 8 WIGMORE § 2195f; 58 Am. JUR. Witnesses § 888 (1948).
35 See, e.g., Lyons v. Lyons, 279 Ala. 329, 331, 185 So.2d 121, 122-23 (1966);
cf., e.g., Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (power
of Senate to issue warrant) ; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 180 (1927) (same).
36279 U.S. 597 (1929). Although the Barry case actually involved the power
of the Senate to issue a warrant for a witness when acting as judge of election
returns, the Court assumed that a court would have the same power as the Senate.
"[A] court has power in the exercise of a sound discretion to issue a warrant of
arrest without a previous subpoena when there is good reason to believe that other-
wise the witness will not be forthcoming." Id. at 616.
Perhaps more serious is the situation in which the arrest is made without a
warrant by the police. In State v. Hand, 101 N.J. Super. 43, 242 A.2d 888 (1968)
a woman was arrested without a warrant as a material witness against her husband.
She was subsequently examined with a police doctor and charged with being under
the influence of narcotics. She moved to suppress the doctor's testimony on the
ground that her arrest as a material witness was illegal. The court found "the
common law to be that a peace officer may arrest without a warrant when he has
reasonable basis or probable cause to believe a person is a necessary and material
witness to a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and that
person might be unavailable for service of subpoena." Id. at 56, 242 A2d at 895.
The court used as its authority the common law of arrest in New Jersey, which
allows arrest on probable cause to believe that specified crimes have been or are
being committed and that the person arrested is the perpetrator. It argued that
it was not precluded from reaching this result by the New Jersey statutes providing
for the posting of bond by witnesses to assure appearance, since they made no
provision for the manner of the witness's apprehension.
The court decided that, even though it is a "subjective judgment," an officer
could determine whether a witness was necessary and material and would be un-
[Vo1.117:700
WITNESSES
of liberty, since it permits his incarceration before he has misbehaved
in any way.
37
The process of securing the attendance of witnesses and punishing
recalcitrant witnesses who are needed at a trial or other judicial pro-
ceeding has been facilitated by the widespread adoption of the Uniform
Act To Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in
Criminal Proceedings.3 This law should silence the cry of many courts
that a witness is likely to leave the state and be forever free from service
of its process.39 It does not, however, solve the problem created by a
hiding witness who cannot be located. In substance it provides that
any judge of a court of record may certify that an individual is a
material witness in a criminal prosecution or grand jury investigation
in that state. A judicial hearing will then be held in the state where
the witness is found. If the judge determines at this hearing that the
witness is material and necessary, that no undue hardship will result
from compelling him to attend and testify, and that he will not be
subject to arrest or service of process in the other state, the judge will
issue a summons directing the witness to attend and testify. If the
witness does not attend as ordered, he can be punished through the
contempt power of the state ordering his attendance.'
There is one further sanction against witnesses who seek to avoid
testifying. The Federal Fugitive Felon Act 1 enacted by Congress
in order to aid states in law enforcement, makes it a federal crime to
travel in interstate commerce to avoid testifying in major state criminal
proceedings.
available. Id. at 57, 242 A.2d at 895-96. In the case before the court, however,
the arresting officers did not have probable cause for their determination of these
factors. The entire discussion was unnecessary to the decision, because, as the court
itself said, "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence," which
is what was found as a fact in the case. Id. at 58, 242 A.2d at 896 (quoting United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932)).
37 See discussion in text accompanying notes 98-112 infra.
38 See note 21 supra. The act was upheld against constitutional challenge in
New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959), the Court relying heavily on Barry v.
United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). See text accompanying
note 36 supra.
30 See Crosby v. Potts, 8 Ga. App. 463, 468, 69 S.E. 582, 584 (1910). The
widespread adoption of this statute has been an influential factor in the Supreme
Court's right-to-confrontation decisions. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723
n.4 (1968).
4-0The description above assumes that both states have adopted the Uniform
Witness Act.
41 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1964)
Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent
... (2) to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceeding in such place
in which the commission of an offense punishable by death or which is a
felony under the laws of such place, or which in the case of New Jersey,
is a high misdemeanor under the laws of said State, is charged, shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
The act was held constitutional in Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947), despite contentions that it violated the
right of free ingress and egress.
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III. DEPRIVATION OF A WITNESS'S LIBERTY PRIOR TO DISOBEDIENCE
A. State Statutes
Every state provides that a prosecution witness ' who is "neces-
sary and material" 4 to a criminal proceeding in the state may be re-
quired to execute a recognizance for his appearance. 44  As an incident
of this power, courts have the authority to issue an arrest warrant in
case of noncompliance. Most states also allow courts to require bond
from a witness, and in many of these the witness may be imprisoned if
he is unable or unwilling to meet the requirements.4 5  This power to
detain witnesses who cannot post bail involves a deprivation of liberty
where there is not even probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed or that the individual has done it. Even the most stringent
statutes require only probable cause, or reason to believe, that a wrong-
ful act will be committed,46 such as, failure to obey a subpoena, flight in
42 A few states provide the same procedure against defense witnesses as against
prosecution witnesses. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 1889 (1942). An early New Jersey
case, State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.L. 220 (1824), required a defense witness to execute
a recognizance, but New Jersey law now requires this only from prosecution wit-
nesses in high misdemeanor cases. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:162-2 (1953). Some
statutes are ambiguous about whether they include defense witnesses. E.g., IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 9-720, 9-1601 (1956); PA. R. CRIm. P. 4014. Others clearly say "against
the prisoner." E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §2937.16 (Page 1953); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 276, 345 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.54 (1945).
43 The precise phraseology, of course, varies from state to state; most states
say only "material." The N.Y. PROPOSED CRIM. CODE § 330.20(1) (a) allows a wit-
ness to be required to post bail or be detained if he "[p]ossesses information material
to the determination of [the] action."
Although a separate meaning might be inferred for the word "necessary" when
it appears, there is no authority that develops such a distinction. In State v. Hand,
101 N.J. Super. 43, 242 A.2d 888 (1968), there was some discussion attributing
a different meaning to the words, but it could hardly be called conclusive.
44 See Comment, supra note 5, at 38. A recognizance is an "obligation of record,
entered into before some court of record, or magistrate duly authorized, with con-
dition to do some particular act; as to appear at . . . criminal court, to keep the
peace, to pay a debt, or the like." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 1436 (4th ed. rev.
1968). Unless specifically authorized a court cannot detain a witness for refusal to
give recognizance. Comfort v. Kittle, 81 Iowa 179, 182, 46 N.W. 988, 989 (1890) ;
Bates v. Kitchel, 160 Mich. 402, 407, 125 N.W. 684, 686 (1910). A statute that
authorizes compelling a "recognizance" from the witness does not thereby authorize
requiring bail or sureties. Comfort v. Kittle, supra, at 184-85, 46 N.W. at 990.
The dissenting judge in that case said that recognizance "[c]ontemplates an obliga-
tion which is intended by the law to secure the attendance of the person giving
it . . . . When the books speak of a recognizance, without more it is understood
that bail is given." Id. at 185-86, 46 N.W. at 990-91. The statutes, however, follow
the majority approach and say "with sureties" where more is meant. Where it is
not so specified, sureties can not be required. People ex rel. Ljubisich v. Brown,
276 Ill. 186, 114 N.E. 583 (1916) ; State v. Lane, 11 Kan. 458 (1873).
Recognizances are also used where there is an adjournment or continuance.
See Fawcet v. Linthecum, 7 Ohio C.C.R. 141 (1893); State v. Lane, 11 Kan.
458 (1873).
45 Certain states require separate facilities for housing witnesses. E.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. §2A: 162-3 (1953). Recovery for breach of the statute, however, has
proved virtually impossible in the absence of a statute conferring such a right.
E.g., Watkins v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 73 N.J.L. 213, 62 A. 1134 (1906).
46 A similar procedure of requiring a recognizance, bail and detention is often
authorized against persons who threaten a breach of the peace. See text accompany-
ing notes 107-09 infra.
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interstate commerce in violation of the Federal Fugitive Act, or viola-
tion of any other law the state may have passed to punish recalcitrant
witnesses." The standard of probable cause used to arrest a person
suspected of criminal conduct, may be inappropriate as a standard to
detain a witness. At this point, however, it is important to note that
state law often allows detention of witnesses in the absence of even
minimal showing.
The test for determining which witnesses may be required to post
bond differs among the states. Some states require only a showing
that the witness is material; 48 others require in addition a showing
that the witness is unlikely to appear unless security is posted or that it
will be "impracticable" to secure the appearance of the witness by sub-
poena.49  New York is in the first category, requiring merely that the
witness be "necessary and material." "o New York courts have re-
garded the factor of likelihood of flight only in setting the amount of
bail and not in determining whether bail should be required at ally1
47 There has been little attempt to increase penalties for noncompliance with a
subpoena rather than requiring prior security. But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§109-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969):
If the defendant is held to answer the judge may require any material
witness for the State or defendant to enter into a written undertaking to
appear at the trial, and may provide for the forefeiture of a sum certain in
the event the witness does not appear at the trial. Any witness who refuses
to execute a recognizance may be committed by the judge to the custody
of the sheriff until trial.
48 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 618-b (McKinney 1958).
4 9 See, e.g, MIcE. Comp. LAWS § 767.35 (1968) (emphasis added):
Whenever it shall appear to any court of record that any person is a
material witness in any criminal case pending of any court of the county
and that there is danger of the loss of testimony of such witness unless he
be required to furnish bail or be committed in the event that he fails to
furnish such bail, said court . . . shall require such witness to be brought
before him and after giving him an opportunity to be heard, if it shall
appear that such witness is a material witness and that there is danger of
the loss of his testimony . . . said court may require such witness to enter
into recognizance with such sureties and in such amount as the court may
determine for his appearance at any examination or trial of said cause. All
witnesses who fail to so recognize shall be committed to jail by said court,
there to remain until they comply with such order or are discharged by
future order ....
The words emphasized could easily be read to require bail or detention where the
witness himself has indicated no intent to refuse to appear, but where others might
prevent his attendance. Other statutes use words such as "cause to believe that
a witness will not perform the condition of his recognizance." MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 276, § 47 (1968). To the same effect see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.54
(1947).
5o N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 618-b (McKinney 1958). Although the statute
was once held unconstitutional, because it did not require a showing that the witness
will not respond to a subpoena, People ex rel. Maloney v. Sheriff of Kings County,
117 Misc. 421, 424, 192 N.Y.S. 553, 554 (Sup. Ct. 1921), this case has not been
followed. People ex rel. Farina v. Wallis, 208 App. Div. 720, 202 N.Y.S. 945
(1924) (mem.) ; People ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of Kings County, 171 Misc. 248,
251, 12 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 256 App. Div. 1081, 12 N.Y.S.2d
232 (1939) ; People ex rel. Bruno v. Maudlin, 123 Misc. 906, 206 N.Y.S. 523 (Sup.
Ct. 1924); see 5 SYRAcuSE L. REV. 213 (1954).
51 O'Connell v. McElhiney, 138 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (flight "unlikely";
$50,000 bail for witness "excessive").
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Some liberalization is attempted in its proposed new Code of Criminal
Procedure. The applicable sections require a showing that the witness
"[w] ill not be amenable or responsive to a subpoena at a time when his
attendance will be sought" before a court can issue a "material witness
order" requiring the witness to post bail."2
The power to require a witness to secure his future appearance is
authorized at different stages of a criminal proceeding in the several
states. Under some statutes the material witness cannot be required
to furnish bail or be detained in its absence until "the prisoner is ad-
mitted to bail or committed by a magistrate"; " under others there
need only be a criminal proceeding "pending" 14 and, in at least one case,
it was held lawful to detain a witness for four months before the sus-
pect was apprehended." Those statutes which allow the proceeding
against the witness to begin before the defendant is apprehended " are
open to particularly serious abuse, as they can be used to detain suspects
(as "witnesses") where there is no probable cause to make an arrest,
and, in any event, can result in a long period of needless detention for a
witness even if no defendant is ever arraigned.57 New York's proposed
statute contains a list of three situations in which a "material witness
order" may be issued." One of these is when a "felony complaint" is
52
1. A material witness order may be issued upon the ground that there
is reasonable cause to believe that a person whom the people or the defendant
desire to call as a witness in a pending criminal action:
(a) Possesses information material to the determination of such action;
and
(b) Will not he amenable or responsive to a subpoena at a time when
his attendance will be sought.
2. A material witness order may be issued only when:
(a) An indictment has been filed in a superior court and is currently
pending therein; or
(b) A grand jury proceeding has been commenced and is currently
pending; or
(c) A felony complaint has been filed with a local criminal court and
is currently pending therein.
N.Y. PROPOSED CRIM. CODE § 330.20.
3 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-720 (1956) ; PA. R. CRrI. P. 4014.
54 E.g., MICH. ComP. LAWS §767.35 (1968); N.Y CODE CRIM. PROC. §618-b
(McKinney 1968).
A "pending" criminal proceeding apparently includes a grand jury investiga-
tion, in re Prestigiacomo, 234 App. Div. 300, 255 N.Y.S. 289 (1932) (dictum), but
not a district attorney's investigation, People v. Doe, 261 App. Div. 504, 26 N.Y.S.2d
458 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
55In re Grzyeskowiak, 267 Mich. 697, 255 N.W. 359 (1934).
5 6 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, §49 (1968): "Upon a complaint or
indictment for a felony, against a defendant not in custody, a material witness com-
mitted for failure to furnish sureties upon his own recognizance may be held in
custody for a reasonable time, pending the pursuit and apprehension of the defendant."
57 Cf. PA. R. CRIM. P. 4014, comment: "Rule is not intended to permit a witness
being detained prior to arrest, as such arrest may never take place."
58 See note 52 supra.
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pending. This would apparently allow a witness to be required to post
bail or be detained even before a grand jury is convened.5"
The obvious question raised by these procedures is why a witness
should be required to give any security for his appearance before it is
shown that he is likely not to appear. Asking this very question,"°
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1872 construed the Minnesota
statute to require a showing of "intention of not appearing and testi-
fying when duly subpoenaed," 1 adding that judicial discretion to re-
quire detention could certainly not be exercised in a contrary manner.
If, for instance, it would be unjust or oppressive, and against
common law and common right, as it certainly would be . . .
to commit such material witness in default of bail, without
any proof that he had any intention of not appearing and tes-
tifying when duly subpoenaed, but who is too poor to render
his recognizance of any value, or too friendless to be able to
give bail, in what sense could it be said, that in the exercise of
a sound legal discretion, the court could be warranted in so
doing; or what interest of the state requires the incarceration
of such a person? Certainly none. 2
It seems more than likely that high bail is sometimes set to serve
one of two purposes not mentioned in the statutes: to detain-and
thereby protect-a witness who may be in danger, or to isolate him
from those who might seek to buy his testimony. These practices,
however, are rarely admitted, 3 and none of the witness statutes allows
bail to be set for any purpose other than to assure appearance. But a
glance at the cases will reveal that bail is often set with the knowledge
that it cannot be met, obviously for the purpose of detention. 4 Although
some cases make no distinction between those witnesses who are un-
willing and those who are unable to post bail," such a distinction is
59 See Comment, stpra note 5, at 38 n.7. Although the requirement of recog-
nizance is mandatory in some states and discretionary in others, no significance
can be attached to this factor since in every case the magistrate or judge must first
determine that the witness is material-a criterion that requires itself an exercise
of discretion. Furthermore, in most cases, the judge has discretion whether or not
to require bail, and to set the amount of bail if required.
60 State ex rel. Howard v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398, 403-04 (1872).
61 Id. at 403.
621d. at 403-04 (citations omitted).
63But see 8A J. MooRz, FEDERAL PRACtICE 1146.11, at 46-51 (1968), stating:
"the original purpose of material witness proceedings . . . was to obtain protective
custody of the witness pending trial" (emphasis in original).
04See, e.g., text accompanying note 84 infra.
65Compare Markwell v. Warren County, 53 Iowa 422, 5 N.W. 570 (1880)
(witness unable to post bond not entitled to witness fee for period of detention) with
Hall v. County Comm'rs, 82 Md. 618, 34 A. 771 (1896) (opposite result) and with
Ex parte Sheppard, 43 Tex. Crim. 372, 66 S.W. 304 (1902) (witness unable to give
security must be released on recognizance).
1969]
712 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
made in a few state statutes, 6 and some courts have used their dis-
cretion to release indigent witnesses on their own recognizance.
6 7
A limitation on the power of the state to detain witnesses is im-
posed by certain state constitutions that prohibit unreasonable detention
of witnesses.6" But these state constitutional guarantees have been for
the most part of little force.69 An exception is that found in the
Colorado Constitution which specifically limits detention of witnesses
to the period necessary to take a deposition.7"
B. Federal Law
The federal law applicable to witnesses in federal courts provides
a significant contrast to many state laws. Material witnesses, both for
16 In Arizona, a witness who cannot give security must be examined condi-
tionally within three days and released. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1843(b)
(1956). In Massachusetts, "if the court or justice finds that the witness . . . is
unable to procure sureties when so ordered, he shall, except in cases of felony, be
discharged upon his own recognizance." MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 276, § 49 (1968)
(emphasis added). In Minnesota, "except in case of murder in the first degree,
arson where human life is destroyed, and cruel abuse of children, [a magistrate] shall
not commit any witness who shall offer to recognize, without sureties, for his appear-
ance." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.54 (1947).
67 E.g., United States v. Lloyd, 26 F. Cas. 984 (No. 15,614) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1860).
Requiring bail that a witness is unable to meet of course raises most of the
questions that have been asked about the constitutionality of the money bail (or
ransom) system in the United States. To say the least, the questions are serious;
the literature on the subject is voluminous. See, e.g., D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL
IN THE UNITED STATES (1964); R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERI-
CAN BAIL SYSTEmr (1965); Foote, The Coining Contstitutional Crisis in Bail,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 959 (1965). For citations to most of the literature, see Note,
Tinkering with the California Bail System, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1968).
In New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 8 (1958), the Supreme Court noted that
the Florida statute in question did not provide for the release of witnesses on bail,
but declined to consider the questions raised because the record showed no evidence
that release on bail had ever been sought and denied. For a state case holding that
$250,000 bail was not excessive for a witness held over three months, see People
ex rel. Rao v. Adams, 296 N.Y. 231, 72 N.E.2d 170 (1947).
'8 E.., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 16; N.Y. CONST.
art. 1, § 5.
09 Compare People ex rel. Rao v. Adams, 296 N.Y. 231, 72 N.E.2d 170 (1947)
($250,000 bail not excessive for witness detained over three months) with N.Y.
CONST. art. 1, § 5 ("Excessive bail shall not be required . . . nor shall witnesses be
unreasonably detained."). California, however, has given more weight to similar
provisions. E.g., Ex parte Dressier, 67 Cal. 257, 7 P. 645 (1885) ; Ex parte Shaw,
61 Cal. 58, 59 (1882).
70
No person shall be imprisoned for the purpose of securing his testimony
in any case longer than may be necessary in order to take his deposition.
If he can give security he shall be discharged; if he cannot give security his
deposition shall be taken by some judge of the supreme, district or county
court, at the earliest time he can attend, at some convenient place by him
appointed for that purpose, of which time and place the accused and the
attorney prosecuting for the people shall have reasonable notice. The
accused shall have the right to appear in person and by counsel. If he have
no counsel, the judge shall assign him one in that behalf only. On the
completion of such examination the witness shall be discharged on his own
recognizance, . . . but such deposition shall not be used if in the opinion
of the court the personal attendance of the witness might be procured by the
prosecution, or is procured by the accused.
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 17.
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the prosecution and the defendant, are covered by the Bail Reform Act
of 1966 " which was intended to make detention the exception rather
than the rule.72  Restrictions can be imposed on a material witness 73
if it is shown that "it may become impracticable to secure his presence
by subpena." 74 In that event the witness is subject to the provisions of
the Act applicable to defendants, and the judge is directed to impose the
least of a graded series of restrictions that "will reasonably assure [his]
appearance," 7' including supervision and restriction on travel or living
situs as well as personal security and bail.
70
The Bail Reform Act also provides that "[n] o . . . witness shall
be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release
if [his] testimony . . . can adequately be secured by deposition, and
further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice." 77 A
number of early state cases employed this alternative,"8 which is pro-
vided by statute or constitution in several states. Exemplary procedures
are found in Colorado 7 and Arizona.80  In contrast to either the fed-
eral model or one of the liberal state models, the proposed New York
statute limits the means of securing attendance to the imposition of
some form of bail, and makes no provision for examining a witness
71 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (Supp. III, 1968). Prior to the Bail Reform Act,
detention of witnesses in the federal courts was governed by FED. R. CRim. P. 46(b),
which gave the court power to require bail of a material witness upon a showing
"that it may become impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena." If the wit-
ness failed to make bail he could be detained and bail "was almost invariably set in
amount beyond [the witness's] resources to insure his detention pending trial."
8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1146.11, at 46-51 (1968).
72 See 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2295-99 (1966).
73 The statute does not distinguish prosecution from defense witnesses, although
courts may.
74 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (Supp. III, 1968).
75 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (Supp. III, 1968).
76 d. The judge may:
(1) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization
agreeing to supervise him;
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the
person during the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and
the deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed,
of a sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond . . .
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties ...
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure
appearance as required, including a condition requiring that the person
return to custody after specified hours.
77 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (Supp. III, 1968). In addition, § 3150(3) imposes a penalty
of not more than $1000 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both, for
willful failure to appear after release.
78 See, e.g., People v. Lee, 49 Cal. 37 (1874) ; State v. Kemp, 124 La. 85, 49 So.
987 (1909).
79 COLO. CoN'sT. art. 2, § 17, quoted note 70 supra.
SO AiZ. REv. STAT. ANx. 13-1843(b) (1956). In Massachusetts, depositions
may be taken with the consent of defendant. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN,. ch. 276, § 50
(1968).
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to reduce the period of possible detention." Failure to provide for
mandatory examination and release may be due to the fact that a
witness can be detained before a suspect is apprehended; 2 examination
by defense counsel would obviously be impossible in such circumstances.
No doubt many arrangements are informally made between wit-
nesses and prosecutors in which witnesses agree to certain restrictions
on their liberty. They may do so out of fear for their own safety, or
because pressure is exerted upon them by the prosecutor. The prose-
cutor's leverage to force such a "voluntary" agreement will in turn re-
flect the strictness of the state's witness policy. It is also possible that
judges confronted with a general statute will release witnesses on their
own recognizance or with alternative restrictions such as orders not to
leave the state.
A timely illustration of the procedure at stake is seen in the case
of State ex rel. Stephens v. Luttrell.3 Charles Quitman Stephens was
a central witness to Martin Luther King's murder. By agreement with
the prosecutor's office, Stephens first willingly stayed in jail, free to
come and go with a guard. Fearing for his safety, the state invoked
its material witness statute,84 and the court set bail at $10,000, which
Stephens could not meet. He was thus confined in jail, where he was
allowed no visitors.8Y His petition for habeas corpus was granted, and
he was released on condition that he "remain within the jurisdiction of
Shelby County, Tennessee . . . and submit to police protection." "
The judge hearing the petition noted that Stephens was not uncoopera-
tive and had not indicated that he "intended to leave the jurisdiction." 87
C. The Common Law
Since every state now provides by statute for some form of pretrial
detention of witnesses,"8 whether or not the common law authorized
such detention before a prospective witness disobeyed a subpoena
might seem only of historical importance. Since there may be areas not
covered by the statutes, and since questions of judicial interpretation
arise because of imprecise language, the common law of witness deten-
tion is still worth examination.
American courts that have considered the issue have generally held
that there is no common-law power to detain a witness before he has
81 See N.Y. PROPOSED CRIM. CODE, §§ 330.50, 330.60.
8 2 Id. § 330.20(2) (c). See note 52 supra.
83 No. 13997 R.D. (Cir. Ct. Shelby County, Tenn., Aug. 21, 1968).
84 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1122 to -27 (1955).
85 TIME, Sept. 13, 1968, at 70-71.
86 No. 13997 R.D. (Cir. Ct. Shelby County, Tenn., Aug. 21, 1968).
87 Id
88 Possibly through an oversight, the Indiana statute allows recognizance (with
or without sureties) to be required, but is silent on detention. IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 9-720, 9-1601 (1956).
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misbehaved."s In almost all of the cases upon which this conclusion is
based, however, there was an existing material witness statute author-
izing bail and detention, but the proceeding involved did not appear to
fit under the statute. The courts in such circumstances have construed
the statutes strictly, considering the requirement of sureties "the exer-
cise of an unusual and extraordinary power [which] should not be
exercised where authority is doubtful." "
The power to require persons, without accusation of
wrong, and without a hearing to give even their own pledge
for their appearance as witnesses, is surely an extraordinary
power, and still more extraordinary when security may be
required and imprisonment imposed for a failure to give it.
The power to bind witnesses by recognizance to appear and
give evidence has long since been conferred upon courts and
judges, by the statutes of many, if not all of the states. We
are not aware that it has ever been exercised in the absence of
statutory authority. 1
Another example of this attitude is Bickley v. Commonwealth,"2
where the witness had already failed to comply with a subpoena. Since
the statute authorized only recognizance and not security, the court held
that the attempt to recognize him with sureties was invalid. "Before
such a doctrine can be tolerated by us, a positive grant of the power by
the legislature must be shown . . . " "
One state court, however, did find a common-law power to detain
a witness if a subpoena and the threat of contempt appear inadequate.
In Crosby v. Potts,9 4 the court reasoned that such a power was a
logical extension of the power to compel the attendance of witnesses.
The justification for this position (expressed by a court that had no
statutory authority to commit witnesses 95) was the fear that the witness
would leave the state and "once he has crossed the state line, he [would
89 Comfort v. Kittle, 81 Iowa 179, 46 N.W. 988 (1890) ; Bickley v. Common-
wealth, 25 Ky. (2 J.J. Mar.) 572 (1829); Bates v. Kitchel, 160 Mich. 402, 407,
125 N.W. 684, 686 (1910) ; State v. Hand, 101 N.J. Super. 43, 51, 242 A.2d 888,
892 (1968) ; Little v. Territory, 28 Okla. 467, 114 P. 69 (1911); see Comment,
Confining Material Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 20 WAsi. & LEE L. RE . 164 (1963).
00 Comfort v. Kittle, 81 Iowa 179, 183-84, 46 N.W. 988, 989 (1890).
91 Id. at 181-82, 46 N.W. at 989.
9225 Ky. (2 J.J. Mar.) 572 (1829).
93 Id. at 574.
04 8 Ga. App. 463, 69 S.E. 582 (1910) ; cf. State ex rel. Gebhardt v. Buchanan,
175 So.2d 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), which involved an accomplice held as
a material witness after he had confessed to his part in a murder and had been
promised immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony. Detention of
an accomplice rests on other grounds. Until his obligation to testify has been
fulfilled, he remains a person accused of crime. Ex parte Carter, 62 Tex. Crim.
113, 136 S.W. 778 (1911); Ex parte Greenshaw, 41 Tex. Crim. 278, 53 S.W.
1024 (1899).
9 This is no longer the case. GA. CODE ANN. §27-410 (1953) allows a court
to require bond of witnesses when a defendant has been bound over for trial.
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be] beyond the grasp of any of the court's processes to bring him to the
trial or to punish him for his refusal to answer to a subpoena." 96 This
reasoning has been largely eroded by the Uniform Witness Act,97 and
presents little justification for detaining a witness either by common
law or by statute.
D. Preventive Justice
The indefinite detention of an individual innocent of any crime
almost certainly offends the average citizen's sense of fair play far more
than the detention of a person arrested on "probable cause" and charged
with committing a crime." Since there is more than a possibility
that one accused has committed an offense against society, it is not
too hard to rationalize restrictions on his liberty. But one cannot so
easily assuage his conscience over the incarcerated witness. A federal
court sitting in 1860 eloquently articulated the fundamental harshness
of such detention.99 Despite such early awareness the witness today
can hope for little more than was granted the witness in 1860-possible
release by a compassionate judge. Only in recent years has there been
any tightening of the standards for detention and some movement
toward granting relief to witnesses who cannot post bail by requiring
that depositions be taken and witnesses released. 00
96 8 Ga. App. at 468, 69 S.E. at 584.
97 See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
9 8 See Livermore et al., supra note 1, at 78:
[W]e can by reason of his guilt distinguish the criminal from others whom
we loathe to confine. He voluntarily flouted society's commands with an
awareness of the consequences. Consequently, he may serve utilitarian
purposes without causing his prisoners any moral twinge.
See generally id. 75-78.
09
These laws afford no exemption for the aged, or the feeble, or those who,
from infirmities of body or mind, are dependent on the attention and the
services of others, or who must be separated by such arrest or detention,
from the most stringent calls of their own business, or from supplying help
or solace to their families or friends . . . . None but those who can furnish
competent bail, that is, who have the command of money or credit, can
exonerate themselves from instantaneous incarceration for an indeterminate
period of time, and, from being imprisoned no less absolutely . . . than if
abandoned culprits. This cruel exaction not only falls upon and overpowers
the citizen at home ... but, in practice, a stranger on a journey, or pursuing
his occupations away from his residence or family, is equally subject to
instant arrest and imprisonment, if he knows, or is supposed to know, facts
connected with a criminal transaction by an accused party, with whom he
may have no connection other than perhaps accidental knowledge of some
particular which may tend to convict the suspected party of having com-
mitted a criminal offense. It is to be apprehended, moreover, that this
oppressive power is not always exercised with the most prudent precaution,
or kept in force only during the shortest period possible to secure to the
government the benefit of testimony thus sought for; but prosecutions are
allowed to be procrastinated, under trivial excuses, so as to cause deeper
wrongs and injuries to the witness than is reasonably necessary.
United States v. Lloyd, 26 F. Cas. 984, 985 (No. 15,614) (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1860).
100 The most commendable attempts at reform are no doubt the Bail Reform
Act of 1966, see 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (Supp. III, 1968), and the Illinois statute, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969), as well as statutes already
discussed that make exceptions for persons unable to make bail.
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That some intrusion into individual freedom is constitutionally
permissable seems clear.'' A citizen may be required to serve on a
jury and be locked up for days; the Supreme Court has upheld "stop
and frisk" laws; 102 a witness must comply with a subpoena ... and,
indeed, the sixth amendment expressly provides for compulsory process.
But all of these limitations on freedom, often cited as justifications for
upholding the detention of witnesses, 0 4 are distinguishable from the
problem of detention of witnesses. Only jury duty entails confinement,
and the confinement is not in a prison. The other restrictions are
considerably less severe.
The requirement that an individual secure his appearance as a
witness through bail or detention is a deprivation of personal freedom
in order to assure future conduct. It is, unlike the jury lock-up, not
necessary for the present performance of the witness's duty to appear
and testify. The requirement of security, however, depends upon the
court's prediction of the witness's future behavior-whether or not he
will appear at trial. Such an imposition on personal liberty because of
a fear of future misbehavior is not unknown to the law: civil commit-
ment of the mentally ill is often based on precisely such a prediction of
future misbehavior. Some of the justifications for civil commitment
have recently come under attack,' discussion of which is beyond the
scope of this Comment. But one crucial difference must be noted: the
predictions in such cases are at least based on psychiatric testimony
concerning the present mental state of the person to be detained.10 6
In addition to civil commitment of the mentally ill, an imposition
on personal liberty to control future conduct is made in two other areas:
the bail process for those accused of crime, which has been discussed
above,' 7 and the now rare requirement of security to prevent future
breaches of the peace.'0 8 The practice of requiring certain persons to
give security to keep the peace was known at common law in England
101 Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 169 (1941).
102 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
103 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1918).
104 See, e.g., People ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of Kings County, 171 Misc. 248,
12 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. 1939); cf. Barber v. Moss, 3 Utah 2d 268, 282 P.2d
838 (1956), noted in 5 UTAH L. REV. 119 (1956).
105 See generally Livermore et al., supra note 1.
Io(0See Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commit-
ment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 80-81 (1968).
'
0 7 See note 98 supra.
108 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §23 (1964):
If any person shall threaten the person of another to wound, kill or destroy
him, or do him any harm in person or estate, and the person threatened shall appear
before a justice of the peace, and attest, on oath or affirmation, that he believes that
by such threatening he is in danger of being hurt in body or estate, such person so
threatening . . . shall be bound over, with one sufficient surety, to appear at the
next sessions, according to law, and in the meantime to be of good behavior, and
keep the peace toward all citizens . ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §24-27 (1964) provide hearing procedures and require
that the justice of the peace suggest the parties compromise their differences.
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and the United States, and presently appears in state statutes obligating
those who have threatened the life or property of another to post bail as
a deterrent to the commission of the act.1 09 A person unable to supply
the bail can be committed to jail1 10 Regardless of the propriety of this
procedure, clearly threatening a person with physical harm "' is a
stronger justification for the imposition of restrictions on personal
liberty than the fear that a witness will not appear at trial. A person
who has threatened to harm another has, at least, engaged in an overt
wrongful act before being required to post security. This would be
analogous to requiring security only from witnesses who actually
threaten to flee the court's process.'12 In addition, the harm done
through physical violence may also be irreparable; failure of a witness
to appear can very likely be cured by postponing the trial until he can
be compelled to appear.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Whatever one's views on the wisdom of state and federal witness
statutes, there remains the question of their constitutionality. The fifth
and fourteenth amendment guarantees against the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law, and the fourth amendment's protec-
tion from unreasonable searches and seizures are the foundations upon
which any constitutional attack must be built.
A number of questions arise in the constitutional area. First, are
the statutory deprivations justifiable as a proper exercise of the police
power of the state to provide for the health, safety and welfare of the
people? Second, assuming that some form of statute is constitutional,
what form is it? Certainly there must be some showing that the wit-
ness is likely to be unavailable at trial before bail or imprisonment can
be justified. The third question is more difficult. Is a mere showing
that the witness is likely not to appear sufficient to authorize extended
detention? It is generally assumed that one cannot be imprisoned on
the mere likelihood that one will commit a crime in the future.1 3 The
Constitution requires a careful balancing of the needs of the state and
the extent of deprivation of individual liberty necessary to effectuate
them. The precise balance is best made by the legislature, but the
109 See generally State ex rel. Yost v. Scouszzio, 126 W.Va. 135, 27 S.E.2d
451 (1943).
110 11 C.J.S. Breach of Peace §§ 17-25 (1938).
111 Breach of the peace statutes require more active antisocial behavior on the
part of one required to post bond than is generally required of the material witness.
The elements of the offense are making a threat to a person, and putting him in danger
of being hurt. See Commonwealth v. Taub, 187 Pa. Super. 440, 444, 144 A.2d 628,
630 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 23 (1964). Danger of actual harm and
malicious threats are required. Commonwealth v. Cushard, 184 Pa. Super. 193,
196, 198, 132 A.2d 366, 368-69 (1957).
112See also 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law §2010 (1962): "At common law and
under statutes the courts may in some cases require a convicted person to furnish
security for good behavior . . . ." See, e.g., Arnold v. State, 213 Miss. 667, 670,
57 So.2d 484, 485-86 (1952) (conviction for drunken driving).
13 See, e.g., 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 37 (1961).
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courts can and must impose minimum standards and invalidate schemes
which too broadly restrict liberty. Bail or detention should be imposed
only where there is no less restrictive way to assure the appearance of
a witness. Finally, whatever factors are considered sufficient to author-
ize detention, what procedural protections must be available to the
witness?
Statutes permitting witnesses to be required to make recognizance,
post bail, or be detained have regularly been held constitutional by the
courts. Their constitutionality rests on dicta in Barry v. United States
ex rel. Cunninghant n4 where the Supreme Court, referring to a federal
statute, said: "The constitutionality of this statute has never been
doubted. Similar statutes exist in many of the states and have been
enforced without question." "i' In Barry, however, the Court cited
state cases and secondary authority that confined the right to detain
witnesses to situations in which the witness would otherwise be unlikely
to appear.-" The Barry case itself involved the arrest of a previously
uncooperative witness."
7
The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the question since
that time, although dicta appear in two other cases indicating the same
general acceptance of detention of witnesses. In Stein v. New York,"'
while passing on the admissibility of a confession, the Court said: "The
duty to disclose knowledge of crime rests upon all citizens. It is so vital
that one known to be innocent may be detained, in the absence of bail,
as a material witness." 19 And in New York v. O'Neill,'2 ° the Court
found no undue restriction upon interstate travel imposed by the Uni-
form Witness Act at least partly because in its absence, "Florida un-
doubtedly could have held respondent within Florida if he had been a
material witness in a criminal proceeding within that State." 121
In the state courts there has been a similar assumption that the
statutes are constitutional. 22 The cases, however, are of little prece-
114279 U.S. 597 (1929).
115 Id. at 617.
116Id. at 617-18, citing United States v. Lloyd, 26 F. Cas. 984 (No. 15,614)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (bail for witness lowered to $1000 because of personal
hardship, averred intention to answer subpoena, and failure of Government to show
that he would not appear) ; Crosby v. Potts, 8 Ga. App. 463, 469, 69 S.E. 582, 584
(1910) (statute construed to allow imprisonment after default only when witness
is material and might flee state) ; State ex rel. Howard v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398
(1872) (statute, unlimited on its face, construed to require showing that witness
might leave state before imprisonment allowed).
"1 279 U.S. at 619.
118 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
11 Id. at 184 (footnote omitted). See also People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55,
62, 238 N.E.2d 307, 312, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 905 (1968).
120 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
121 Id. at 7; see cases cited note 16 stpra; People v. Hand, 101 N.J. Super. 43,
51, 242 A.2d 888, 892 (1968) ; cf. People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 62, 238 N.E.2d
307, 312, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 905 (1968). See also United States ex rel. Glinton V.
Denno, 309 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1962).
122 I re Petrie, 1 Kan. App. 184, 40 P. 118 (1895) ; cf. Quince v. Langlois, 88
R.I. 438, 149 A.2d 349 (1959).
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dential value today, since many of them were decided in days when the
due process clause had an interpretation considerably different from the
one it has today, and the others (more recent) simply reiterate the
clich6 that the practice is common and that the state needs witnesses.
2 3
The early cases, which do indicate some kind of reasoning process and
upon which the recent decisions unquestioningly rely, express the fear
that there will be no other way to secure the witness when needed.
This is the case in Minnesota ex rel. Howard v. Grace,'24 and in Crosby
v. Potts,'28 which state that courts have an inherent power to detain
persons.
A. The Due Process Clause
The due process clause acknowledges both the interest of the in-
dividual in "life, liberty, and property" and the interest of the state in
performing its governmental functions. If these two interests are in
conflict, the traditional approach has been to balance them. 26 In this
instance it is a balance between the interest of the individual to be un-
hampered in his everyday activity and that of the state to assure his
presence at trial through restrictions of that activity. The extent of
the state interest in having a particular witness present at trial will
vary with the seriousness of the charge, the number of prosecution wit-
nesses, and the nature of the witness's testimony. But no matter how
crucial the witness to the state's case, where there is no reason to
believe that an individual is trying to keep from appearing as a
witness, one returns to the question asked seventy years ago by the
Minnesota Supreme Court: "[W]hat interest of the state requires the
incarceration of such a person ?" 12 The same can be said about the
requirement of security. If the individual can be deterred from non-
compliance with a subpoena by the usual means-the threat of punish-
ment for disobedience-why should additional security be required of
him? The requirement of additional security was no doubt in large
part premised on the fear that was expressed in Crosby v. Potts-that
the witness would cross state lines and be "beyond the grasp of any of
the court's processes." 128 However, since the adoption of the Uniform
Act,12 the mere fact that a witness is a non-resident, for example,
12 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Glinton v. Denno, 309 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1962).
12418 Minn. 398 (1898).
125 8 Ga. App. 463, 69 S.E. 582 (1910).
126 For a general discussion of the due process clause see Ratner, supra note 28.
127Minnesota ex rel. Howard v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398, 403-04 (1898).
128 8 Ga. App. 463, 468, 69 S.E. 582, 584 (1910).
129 In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), the change in a state's ability to
secure the attendance of out-of-state witnesses was recognized. See also Govern-
ment of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). It must be recog-
nized, however, that this change is not conclusive. The Uniform Witness Act has
not been universally adopted, and a witness could always leave the country. Finally,
in some circumstances-where, for instance, a racial issue is involved-a state might
not be completely certain that all other states would as vigorously ferret out recalci-
trant witnesses as might be desirable.
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is not sufficient to give the state a substantial interest in requiring
security or detention.130  To require bail or detention, the state should
have to show that the witness may or will not otherwise appear at the
trial. Inquiry regarding the witness's future appearance does not have
to be limited to the likelihood that he may voluntarily disappear; it
should also include the possibility that others, including the defendant,
will prevent his appearance.
Even though the state is protecting a legitimate interest (assuring
the presence of all witnesses), and its method does implement this in-
terest (detaining all witnesses is one way to assure their presence), the
inquiry is not ended.' 3 ' Legislative interests "cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved." 12 Imprisonment is hardly a trivial
deprivation of liberty, and as such the doctrine that a state cannot im-
plement a legitimate policy unless the statute is "narrowly drawn to
prevent the supposed evil" ' should be applicable.' The Court
applied this standard in Aptheker v. Secretary of State "' to the right
to travel under the fifth amendment when it declared a federal statute
denying passports to members of the Communist party unconstitutional
on its face. Applying the less restrictive alternative test, the Court
noted:
This section, judged by its plain import and by the substan-
tive evil which Congress sought to control, sweeps too widely
and too indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteed in the
Fifth Amendment.'
And in Griswold v. Connecticut,3 7 seven members of the Court voiced
the same concern with state restrictions on fundamental liberties: 18
130 The interest must be sufficient to justify the restraint, see NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1959); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940). The effectiveness of a method to implement the legislative goal is also open
to judicial supervision. See Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116
U. PA. L. Rrv. 1048, 1078 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ratner]. Since detention is
obviously effective to achieve the presence of witnesses, this may not be the issue.
Still, to require bail of one who cannot supply it is a questionable means of securing
a legislative goal. Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
131 "The requirements of due process are a function not only of the extent of
the governmental restriction imposed but also of the necessity for the restriction."
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (footnote omitted). See generally Wormuth &
Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964).
See also Struve, The-Less-Restrictive Alternative Principle and Economic Due
Process, 80 HaRv. L. REv. 1463, 1464 (1967).
132 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
'33 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
134 The interest must be substantial and regulation narrow. Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964).
135 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
-36 Id. at 514.
137381 U.S. 479 (1965).
138 Id. at 485-86 (Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for 5 members of the Court),
503-04 (Mr. Justice White); see id. at 500, where Mr. Justice Harlan explicitly
reaffirmed his views as stated in his dissenting opinion to Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543, 545 (1961), where the same point is made.
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these restrictions are not favored and must not be unnecessarily broad.
Under this analysis, a statute restricting the freedom of movement
of a witness without a showing that he is unlikely to appear at trial
without the restriction would almost certainly have to fall. Even if
there is such a showing, the same logic would require that the restric-
tion be no greater than is necessary to accomplish this goal. For
example, the Bail Reform Act of 1966,' which governs the detention
of witnesses as well as defendants in the federal system, directs the
imposition of the least of a graded series of conditions to insure the
witness's presence at trial. 4° The alternatives listed in the federal
statute are not the only possible ones.' 4' Although the fact that an
alternative is more expensive does not necessarily mean that it is not
required; 142 solutions may vary with the circumstances and resources
of the community. Such other possibilities are police guards, detention
in a hotel rather than in prison, and periodic check-ins.
A statute constitutional on its face still may be unconstitutionally
applied. Such an assertion may be rebutted if it is shown that, for the
particular individual, the restriction applied is the least intrusive of
those alternatives likely to secure the desired result.'43 If it is assumed
that the detention of witnesses can be constitutional because of an actual
threat of loss of testimony, detention for months before a defendant is
apprehended may still be challenged as unconstitutional. Can the state's
need be satisfied in any way short of holding the witness in jail until
the trial? Again, the least restrictive alternative argument could be
used to limit detention to the shortest practical period of time. Unless
the defendant's right of confrontation is impaired when the state intro-
duces a deposition taken from a witness who has failed to appear at trial,
due process should limit detention to the period necessary to take a
deposition.
The defendant's right to be confronted by the witnesses against
him 144 is not absolute. In Barber v. Page,145 the Supreme Court held
that a prosecution could not introduce a transcript from a prior hearing
139 18 U.S.C. § 3141-3152 (Supp. III, 1968).
140As its title indicates, the Act does authorize judges to require bail from
some witnesses. The utility of bail in securing the attendance of defendants for trial
is increasingly open to question. "Today fugitives do not go very far or maintain
their status as such very long, so no money guarantee is required to insure their
appearance when ordered." Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir.
1963) (Wright, J., concurring).
14 The Bail Reform Act itself recognizes the possibility of requiring "any
other condition deemed reasonably necessary." 18 U.S.C. §3146(a) (Supp. III,
1968).
142 See Ratner, vupra note 130, at 1090.
'43 Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
144Made binding on the states by Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965),
and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
145 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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when it had made no effort to obtain the presence of the witnesses, who
were in prison in another state.146  The Court did not rule out the use
of prior testimony where the witnesses were genuinely unavailable. "It
is true that there has traditionally been an exception to the confronta-
tion requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony
at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was
subject to cross-examination by that defendant." 147
The implication of the case is that although a prosecutor must
make a bona fide effort to obtain the direct testimony of a witness,
where such an effort was made and the witness is still unavailable, prior
testimony may be introduced. Barber v. Page and the two circuit court
cases cited in a footnote in the opinion of the Court 148 could be read to
require a narrow interpretation of "unavailable," but seem to be follow-
ing what has been called a "best effort" approach.' 49 Under this ap-
proach, if the state has tried and failed to produce a witness for trial-
using all reasonably available procedures for compelling him to appear,
including the Uniform Act-the court will allow the use of prior testi-
mony. The prior testimony, however, must still have been taken under
circumstances that allowed the defendant an opportunity for cross-
examination.' Those states that detain witnesses before the defend-
ant is apprehended would not have this alternative as long as cross-
examination during the deposition is required.'
Whenever detention is considered necessary, the state could re-
quire an examination of each material witness in the presence of the
accused and his attorney. If the witness later disappears, the state
could, after making a faithful effort to produce him, use the transcript.
There may be exceptional cases where a transcript would not be suffi-
cient-as, for example, in some rape cases where the case will stand or
fall on the prosecutrix's behavior on the witness stand. But in most
cases, this procedure should suffice.
There is, however, always the possibility that the defendant will
assert that the state did not take proper means to secure a witness, par-
146 Id. at 723.
147Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
148 Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 1967) (witness not
unavailable simply because he is in Virgin Islands); Holman v. Washington, 364
F.2d 618, 624 (5th Cir. 1966) (requiring proof witness is unavailable), cited 390
U.S. 726 n.6.
149 Note, Confrontationr and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1439 (1966).
The right of confrontation does have exceptions, but there must be "salient and
cogent reasons for the deprivation." Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 830 (5th
Cir. 1968).
'GOSee Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968). The Court stated that the
exception to the hearsay rule for unavailable witnesses is justified because the
previous availability of cross-examination provides substantial compliance with the
purposes of the requirement of confrontation.
11Although the state might attempt to appoint an attorney for the fugitive
defendant, such an attempt would generally be of little value. Cross-examination
without any possibility of consulting with the defendant (and probably, in most
cases, without any meaningful chance for investigation) would be of little value.
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ticularly if the witness has made overt threats to disappear. But this
claim, of course, can be made even under present procedures. The only
real answer, under any system, is for the state to actually make its best
effort to secure the witness's presence at trial.
B. The Fourth Amendment
Detention of witnesses that violates the fifth amendment due
process clause will also violate the fourth amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable seizures as well. 52 Both the arrest of the witness to
bring him to execute a recognizance and the detention of a witness who
cannot meet bail are seizures of his person ". and must be reasonable
to stay within the first prohibition of the fourth amendmentY 4 When
a warrant is issued, the probable cause standard should apply.'5 5 "The
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." '16
An intrusion is certainly unreasonable if there is no state interest that
requires it-as where there is no likelihood that the witness will not
respond to a subpoena. Since the application of the fourth amendment,
like the fifth, has been considered a balance of the "governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally pro-
tected interests of the private citizen," 157 the same factors are relevant
as in the due process balance.
The detention of a witness who cannot meet bail is much more
serious a deprivation of liberty than the limited intrusion involved in
the stop-and-frisk cases.' In addition, the detained witness is not even
"suspected" of having committed a crime. Before detention is reason-
able there should be more than a suspicion that the witness will not
otherwise appear. A Judge should be convinced that in the absence of
some security, the witness will be unavailable.
152 Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
158 "It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
154 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
155 "No Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
There are really 2 separate steps involved in depriving a witness of liberty:
stopping him on the street for questioning or detaining him at the police station (which
may be preceded by issuance of a warrant), and detention for failure to post bail.
It is the second which is the concern of this Comment, although both are actually
seizures of the person. The standard of probable cause is appropriate only to issuance
of the warrant for the initial arrest.
156 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
157 Terry v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 1, 21, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
358 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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In Terry v. Ohio,'39 the Court said:
It does not follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest
a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant
a belief that the person has committed or is committing a
crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evi-
dence, in making any intrusions short of arrest. 60
But when the witness is taken into custody, whether there is an "ar-
rest" of course depends on how "arrest" is defined. If it is limited to
the taking into custody for the purpose of charging with the commission
of a crime, the witness is not under "arrest." 161 But the only distinc-
tions that have been advanced as a basis for allowing a standard for the
witness "arrest" different from that used for the suspect "arrest" are
the difference in stigma attached to the detention involving an accusa-
tion of crime " and the difficulty of creating a standard for the arrest
of witnesses based on their past behavior. But the witness's detention
still involves the imputation that, unrestrained, he would commit a
wrongful act-and, furthermore, if he is restrained he will have no way
of disproving the imputation. And even if the arrest of a witness can-
not to be based on the same standard used for criminal suspects, the
standard should be one that is based on the past behavior of the witness,
indicating that he will not comply with reasonable requests by au-
thority. 63
There is really no Supreme Court authority for the "arrest" and
taking into custody of a witness other than Barry v. United States ex
rel. Cunninghain.'"  It is probable that a constitutional result will be a
balance which allows police to require witnesses to forfeit some liberty
in order to aid the state in investigating a crime as long as the intrusion
is reasonable under all the circumstances. Just as an individual may
have to endure the inconvenience of attending a trial and testifying as
a witness, he may be required to endure the inconvenience of police
questioning in a reasonable manner, such as detention until preliminary
examination, but he should not be subject to procedures applicable to a
159 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1,O Id. at 26.
161 See W. LA FAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSToDY 4 (1965).
'16 2 See People ex rel. Fusco v. Ryan, 204 Misc. 861, 871, 124 N.Y.S.2d 690,
700-01 (Sup. Ct. 1953), where the court distinguished the consequences of conviction
for a crime from those of detention of a material witness.
163 State v. Hand, 101 N.J. Super. 43, 242 A.2d 888 (1968), suggested that one
relevant consideration before arresting a material witness would be whether he was
a "known prevaricator." Id. at 57, 242 A.2d at 895. Under the N.Y. PRoPosED
CRIMINAL. CODE, a warrant can be issued for a witness to appear at a hearing to
determine whether he should be required to post bail if the allegations to the court
"show the witness would be unlikely to respond to an order or he had previously
disobeyed such an order." Id. § 330.30.
164 279 U.S. 597 (1929). See notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
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suspect, amounting to an actual arrest, unless he can be shown at least
to have breached a duty to cooperate and aid the state. 65
C. Procedural Due Process
Assuming the constitutionality of a statute requiring the material
witness to post security upon proof that less restrictive means cannot
assure his appearance at trial, to what procedural safeguards is a wit-
ness, accused of a probable failure to appear, entitled? Should the
procedural safeguards afforded to such an "accused" differ from those
the state must grant a criminal defendant? 166 Although the conse-
quences of the proceeding may be less serious for the witness than for
the defendant,167 the witness, nonetheless, faces a severe deprivation of
liberty.' 6s
1. Hearing
Despite earlier cases to the contrary," 9 the current notion of "due
process" requires a hearing before either bail is set or detention ordered
upon a witness's failure to meet bail. 7 Under the New York Code
of Criminal Procedure, a judge cannot compel a witness to secure his
future appearance before "an opportunity has been given to such a
165 Conceivably a witness could raise the argument that the equal protection
clause prohibits his detention in lieu of a required bail which he cannot afford to
post. See Foote, The Coming Constitutioial Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
959, 999 (1965); cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But until the equal
protection clause is successfully used by defendants against bail, it is unlikely to
provide relief in the less pressing problem area of detention of witnesses. See generally
W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISIoN To TAKE A SUSPECr INTO CUSTODY, 411-35
(1964) ; Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. REv. 493 (1955). Note, Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 81 HAgv. L. REV. 435, 446-47 (1967).
166 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
167 See note 161 supra.
168 But see People ex rel. Fusco v. Ryan, 204 Misc. 861, 871, 124 N.Y.S.2d 690,
697 (Sup. Ct. 1953):
[Aln order of commitment and bail as a necessary and material witness
does not entail many of the consequences of a judgment of a felony convic-
tion-for example, suspension of civil rights, forfeiture of public office, loss
of right to vote, subjection to deportation if an alien, or to denaturalization
proceedings if not a native-born, computation in case of a multiple criminal
offender, effect upon credibility as a witness, etc. Therefore, the fact that
one has been held under section 618-b is not in any sense tantamount to
conviction for the commission of a crime.
169 In re Petrie, 1 Kan. App. 184, 40 P. 118 (1895). Contra, Minnesota ex rel.
Howard v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398 (1889).
17O See Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963);
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). Even cases giving deference to procedures of another
jurisdiction have required notice and hearing. See, e.g., Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S.
425, 435 (1905) ; Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314, 318 (1903) ; Simon v. Craft,
182 U.S. 427, 437 (1901). Due process and the sixth amendment guarantee a
defendant summarily charged with contempt-an opportunity to be heard and to be
represented by counsel. Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965).
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person to appear before such judge and be heard in opposition thereto
... )y 17 The judge must be satisfied "that such person . . . is a
necessary and material witness for the people in a criminal action
, 172
The Constitution does not require that a due process hearing be
the same in every case.' 3 State criminal process traditionally met con-
stitutional standards if it "did not conflict with the 'fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice' . . . ." 171 But this loose approach to due
process has been tightened by recent decisions. The question is no
longer whether "a civilized system could be imagined that would not
accord a particular protection . . . . 17' Rather the question has
become "whether . . a particular procedure is fundamental-whether,
that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of
ordered liberty." 176 Certainly, the witness's right to confront and cross-
examine those who claim that he will attempt to avoid testifying should
be considered fundamental and, therefore, required of any state bail
proceeding. A state cannot deny to a criminal defendant the rights of
confrontation and cross-examination at his preliminary hearing.17 And
these rights are not unique to criminal proceedings. In Greene v.
McElroy,"8 the Supreme Court said that an "immutable" principle of
our jurisprudence was that
where Governmental action seriously injures an individual,
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact finding,
the evidence used to prove the government's case must be dis-
closed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show
that it is untrue. . . . We have formalized these protections
in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination.17 9
But detention hearings conducted pursuant to state statutes seldom
guarantee these rights."" The district attorney need present only his
sworn statement as proof of the likelihood that the witness will not ap-
pear; the witness is then given an opportunity to show cause why he
171 N.Y. CODE CuM. PRoc. § 618-a (McKinney 1958).
1721d. New York does not provide for detention of defense witnesses.
173 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
174Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649 (1948), quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
175 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
176Id. at 149-50 n.14.
177 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
178360 U.S. 474 (1959).
170Id. at 496; cf. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961), where the Court allowed revocation of a security clearance without a
hearing only because of the strong "national security" interest, after noting that the
employee affected would lose her job but not, as in Green, her livelihood.
180 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 618-b (McKinney 1958).
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need not be detained.'' Such a procedure hardly seems justifiable.
The state should be required to show more proof than a sworn state-
ment, especially when detention is a likely outcome.'82 Such factors as
the witness's residence, financial responsibility, cooperativeness and re-
lationship to the defendant or offense should be presented for judicial
scrutiny.'83 Factors such as the severity of the crime, the number
of witnesses for the particular issue, and the danger to the witness,
which determine the strength of the state's interest, should also be
presented.
What is required of a witness's hearing might well vary in relation
to the severity of the possible consequences of such hearing. Where
the thrust of the witness detention statute is toward less restrictive alter-
natives, fewer procedural safeguards might be warranted. But where
the thrust of the statute and experience under it indicate high bail re-
quirements and likely detention, more rigorous procedural safeguards
must be invoked. An instructive analogy in the relationship of possible
consequences to procedural safeguards is found in the requirement of
jury trials for serious crimes but not for petty offenses.' 84
2. Right to Counsel
Under New York law a witness is entitled upon request to be
represented by counsel at a detention hearing. 5 Denial of the wit-
ness's request renders such proceeding unlawful.' 6 A 1953 decision,
however, held that a judge's failure to advise a witness of his right "to
demand and procure counsel" violated no statutory or constitutional
18 1 Id.
182Arguably, the light burden placed on the state might be justified on the
ground that a more stringent requirement could reveal the state's case against the
defendant. But it is difficult to imagine why evidence showing that the witness was
unlikely to appear at trial would relate to the prosecution's case against the de-
fendant. The most such an argument could do would be to carve out an exception
for this narrow class of cases. And it is hard to give the argument even that much
weight. Whatever the merits of the case against pretrial discovery, it is difficult
to see in it a justification for the incarceration of an innocent third party.
383 New York's proposed Code of Criminal Procedure goes a long way in this
direction. It provides for a hearing at which the prosecution must prove "by a
preponderance of the evidence" that the witness will not be amenable to a subpoena
"at the time when his attendance will be sought." N.Y. PROpOSED CRIm. ConE
§§330.50(1) (a), 330.20(1) (b). All testimony at the hearing (except that of the
witness, who may testify sworn or unsworn) must be under oath, although the
right of confrontation is sharply limited by the availability of hearsay testimony.
Id. § 330.50(1). The witness is given the same right to counsel-including instruc-
tions and free counsel if required-as a felony defendant. Id. § 330.40(1).
1S4See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The rights of a person
charged with contempt are especially relevant since a witness who disobeys a
subpoena is presumably charged in a criminal contempt proceeding. Those charged
with criminal contempt have rights of counsel, hearing, and jury similar to those
afforded other defendants. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Holt v.
Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
185 People ex rel. Fusco v. Ryan, 204 Misc. 861, 124 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup.
Ct. 1953).
186 Id. at 870, 124 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
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provision.18" While this is still the law of that jurisdiction,:88 current
practice calls for the hearing magistrate to advise the witness of his
right to counsel, and, if the witness cannot afford counsel, to assign
counsel.'8 9
Most witness cases antedate Gideon ' and, therefore, provide little
authority on the question whether a state court must appoint counsel for
indigent witnesses. Gideon itself found only that the Constitution
makes no distinction between capital and noncapital cases, between
deprivations of "life" and deprivations of "liberty." But does the Con-
stitution permit the states to distinguish between brief deprivations of
liberty and substantial deprivations? '' State courts apparently believe
it does. Confronted with arguments that due process "includes only
those procedures that are fair and feasible," 192 state courts today find
that an indigent defendant has no right to appointed counsel in all mis-
demeanor cases or in any traffic or petty offense prosecutions.193 Until
state courts are constitutionally compelled to appoint counsel for indi-
gent accused in all cases involving the likelihood of actual incarceration,
it will be difficult to maintain that counsel must be appointed for the
indigent witness."°
But the indigent witness, who is held without even a suspicion
that he has committed a misdemeanor or petty offense, should argu-
ably be afforded procedural safeguards which are not constitutionally
required for the detention of the accused.'95 Where the witness may
become the accused,9 6 the state has a special interest in advising the
witness of his right to appointed counsel. Such a warning could save
from exclusion evidence obtained through in-custody interrogation of a
witness who later becomes a defendant.
19 7
187Id. at 872, 124 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
188 People ex rel. Van Der Beek v. McCloskey, 18 App. Div. 2d 205, 238
N.Y.S.D.2d 676 (1963).
189 Comment, Witnesses-Imprisonment of the Material Witness for Failure to
Give Bond, 40 NFB. L. REv. 503, 511 n.42 (1961).
100 Gideon v. Wainvright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
191 Id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Harlan has suggested the
Gideon rule applies only "to offenses which . . . carry the possibility of a substantial
prison sentence." Id.
1
9 2 L. HALL & Y. KAMISAR, MODERN CRI'MINAL PROCEDURE 296 (1966) (quoting
Mr. Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court); see Doub & Kestenbaim,
Federal Magistrates for the Trial of Petty Offenses: Need and Constitutionality,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 443, 447 (1959).
'93 See People v. Litterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368, 213 N.E.2d 670
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 911 (1966) ; Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel
in Minnesota, 1, 68-69, 77 (1963).
194 On the other hand, this may not be true in exceptional cases.
195 Massachusetts recently amended its witness statute to provide counsel. M.Ass.
AxN. LAws ch. 276, § 47 (1968). See also the proposed New York statute, sum-
marized at note 183 supra.
190 See text accompanying notes 201-02 infra.
197 Clearly, the Miranda warnings must now be given if the testimony is to be
used against the witness. Id.
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V. ABUSE OF DETENTION
The relatively easy standards used to hold a material witness under
present statutes are easily subject to abuse, and the procedure can
readily turn into a "ruse to interrogate or hold a prospective de-
fendant." "~ This problem is usually posed when the state attempts to
use against a defendant a confession,"" or evidence from a search,200
obtained during the period the defendant was detained as a "witness."
But the Supreme Court's recent decision in Oroczo v. Texas,201 should
bar the use of any statements obtained from an incarcerated witness
unless Miranda warnings have been given. Reversing a conviction
founded on statements taken during interrogation of the defendant at
home in his bedroom, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, said:
The State has argued here that since petitioner was inter-
rogated on his own bed, in familiar surroundings, our Miranda
holding should not apply. . . . But the opinion iterated and
reiterated the absolute necessity for officers interrogating
people "in custody" to give the described warnings. . . . The
Miranda opinion declared that the warnings were required
when the person being interrogated was "in custody at the
station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
way." 384 U.S. 436, 477. (Emphasis supplied.) The de-
cision of this Court in Miranda was reached after careful con-
sideration and was announced in lengthy opinions by both the
majority and dissenting Justices. There is no need to recan-
vass these arguments again. We do not, as the dissent im-
plies, expand or extend to the slightest our Miranda decision.
We do adhere to our well-considered holding in that case
202
The point should be obvious: any custodial interrogation must be pre-
ceded by Miranda warnings if its fruits are to be used against the person
interrogated. The reasoning of Oroczo does not allow for an exception
in the case of a detained material witness.
The necessity of warning a detained witness of his rights under
the Miranda standard-including his right to counsel-may curtail at-
tempts to use witness statutes to interrogate suspects, but it will not do
198 People ex rel. Van Der Beek v. McCloskey, 18 App. Div.2d 205, 210, 238
N.Y.S.2d 676, 682 (1963) ; see People v. Clayton, 28 App. Div.2d 543, 279 N.Y.S.2d
605 (1967).
'99 See United States ex rel. Glinton v. Denno, 200 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), aff'd, 309 F.2d 543 (2d. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 938 (1963).
200 See State v. Hand, 101 N.J. Super. 43, 242 A.2d 888 (1968).
201 Oroczo v. Texas, 37 U.S.L.W. 4060 (U.S., Mar. 25, 1969).
202 Id. at 4060-61.
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the whole job. If the standards for detention are easily satisfied,
that is, if bail which cannot be met is allowed with very little proof of
an intention to avoid testifying, there might be attempts to detain sus-
pects as material witnesses, give the required warnings, and still be in
a better position for questioning than if the suspect could not be de-
tained. This abuse is alleviated by statutes that allow detention only
after a defendant has been charged with the crime, and would be further
decreased if detention of witnesses were the exception and less restric-
tive alternatives were the rule.
Remedies of the Witness
No matter what procedure is followed when a witness is incar-
cerated, there remains the serious question of remedy. It seems clear
that exclusionary rules comparable to those created to enforce the rights
of defendants in criminal proceedings are-except in the rare case where
the witness is himself charged with a crime as a result of interrogation
during the period he is detained 2°3 -unlikely to be developed .20  Even
if they were, they would be unlikely to cover all the situations that could
arise. If the detained witness were one called by the defense, it would
be difficult indeed to bar the use at trial of statements tainted by conduct
not of the defendant, but of the state. Furthermore, in many cases the
exclusionary rule fashioned would have to be exceedingly broad to be
of any use: the exclusion of the witness's testimony at trial would have
to be based on the fact of his illegal detention alone, for in many cases
the police will desire only to hold the witness, not to interrogate him.
For his most pressing need-freedom-the detained witness is re-
mitted to contending his detention on a petition for habeas corpus20
Detention already suffered may be remedied by suit against the person
who caused the imprisonment, or against the state.20 6  At state law,
however, such suits are likely to give little solace. A remedy against
the state itself is available only by statute, and such statutes are rare;
the plaintiffs in Quince v. Rhode Island,20 7 who were held as material
witnesses for 158 days because they could not make $5,000 bail set
without a hearing, were able to maintain their suit only because of a
203 See text accompanying notes 201-02 supra for the argument that statements
so obtained must be excluded unless Miranda warnings have been given.
204 One of the particular problems likely to arise in the fashioning of any such
rule would be the problem of standing: the only person available to challenge the
admissibility of evidence at trial would be the defendant.
20 See, e.g., Quince v. Langlois, 88 R.I. 438, 149 A.2d 348 (1959).
206E.g., Quince v. Rhode Island, 94 R.I. 200, 179 A.2d 485 (1962).
20794 R.I. 200, 179 A.2d 485 (1962). In that case, the plaintiffs had been taken
into custody as material witnesses to a homicide because of a chance observation.
They were held for two days on no charge, at which point the district court set
bail at $5000 without a hearing, and they were held for 158 days in jail before they
obtained their release. Each witness recovered $5000 from the state.
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private act passed by the state legislature. Suits against state officials
are generally unsound, as their limited resources make them unsatis-
factory defendants even if the formidable mass of immunity rules can
be surmounted.20 8
Federal law, at least in theory, provides a broader avenue. The
Civil Rights Act of 1871 29 grants a federal right of action against
persons acting "under color" of state law to deprive others of consti-
tutional rights. Although the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape 
210
construed the statute not to grant a right to recover damages from the
state or its subdivisions, the immunity of individual state officials against
such actions is considerably narrower than that under most state law.
2 1 1
Even this, however, is likely in practice to be of little help. Although
administrative personnel such as policemen are liable absent a "reason-
able belief" that their action was constitutional, 12 judicial officers retain
an absolute immunity from suit 'P--and, in most if not all cases, judicial
personnel will be the only ones whose actions could subject them to
suit.
214
In practice, therefore, there will be a remedy for detention already
suffered only in the most extreme cases. As a consequence, the avail-
ability of procedures to terminate illegal detention presently suffered is
of particular importance. Crucial to the use of any such procedures is
the availability of counsel. Since the witness detained for failure to
make bail is particularly likely to be indigent, appointed counsel must
be available if he is to have any real chance of obtaining his freedom
before the state decides to return it to him. If counsel is not available,
such persons are likely to suffer at least brief periods of detention with-
20 For an exhaustive discussion of the general failure of state tort laws to pro-
vide remedies for violations of individual rights, see Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (1955).
209 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
210265 U.S. 167 (1961).
211 For example, malice need not be alleged. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967) ; Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
212 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
213 Id. at 554. The immunity disappears if the officer is acting completely
outside his jurisdiction, as if the judge of a probate court purports to try a criminal
case, but such situations are-to say the least-rare. Although the Supreme Court
has not ruled on the issue, it is generally assumed that prosecutors partake of
judicial immunity from tort liability for their actions. 27 C.J.S. Dist. & Pros. Att'ys
§16 (1959).
214 If the deprivation of rights is effected under color of federal law, remedy is
even more difficult, for the Civil Rights Act applies only to action under color of
state (or local federal, such as the District of Columbia) law. For actions against
federal officers, plaintiffs are generally limited to such remedies as may be available
under state law in state courts. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947),
declined to find a right of recovery against federal officers absent statutory author-
ization and that decision has been followed with little discussion in the few instances
that the issue has arisen since that time. E.g., Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793 (9th
Cir. 1957). For the contrary argument, see Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies:
Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
1 (1968).
[Vro1.117:700
WITNESSES
out complaint,2 5 and the state will therefore have an incentive to avoid
only the most flagrant abuses. 16
VI. CONCLUSION
The state policy at stake in requiring a witness to post security,
and detaining him if he cannot produce it, is that of securing the presence
of a witness when required to carry out the judicial enforcement of its
laws. This purpose must be kept in mind in examining the means
appropriate to that end. But it is not enough to repeat the maxim that
the duty to disclose knowledge of a crime is so important that "one
known to be innocent may be detained in the absence of bail as a
material witness." 217
The balance between the rights of the witness and the interest of
the state is a delicate one and depends upon a rational and sensitive
procedure that does not automatically require bail of every material
witness. Although more than one solution is possible, a procedure
should include only requirements that are actually needed and that in
fact do secure the presence of witnesses.
One solution mentioned is, of course, to abolish all prior security
other than a personal undertaking and to punish severely failure to
appear. If a state does not wish to go this far, it is still possible to
devise a fair system keeping in mind the following criteria: (1) no one
form of security, such as bail, should be automatically required; (2)
security of any kind should be required only when the witness has be-
haved in a way which indicates that he "threatens" to avoid performing
his obligation; (3) detention should be ordered only where there is no
practical alternative and only if the witness's testimony is essential to
the state or the accused; (4) detention whenever ordered should be for
a specifically limited time. An examination of the witness, at which his
deposition would be taken, should be considered. This, of course, will
not be useful if the defendant has not been apprehended, but detention
prior to apprehension is seriously questionable, even if some other se-
curity provision is justified; and (5) the same procedure should be
used for defense and for prosecution witnesses.
States that ignore the reason for the requirement of security, and
do not first consider whether the usual means-including the Uniform
Act-are a sufficient sanction for noncompliance are almost making it
2 15 Cf. W. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
483-89 (1965), discussing the same problem where persons are arrested with no
intent by the police to charge them with the commission of crime. "[M]any of the
persons arrested for purposes other than prosecution do not attempt to secure their
release on habeas corpus. Knowing that they will shortly be released anyway, they
prefer not to go to this expense." Id. 485.
216 "[E]xperience has taught that [the exclusionary rule] is the only effective
deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
12 (1968).
217 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1952).
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a crime 218 to be a material witness, when in fact being a witness may
be like being tall or short-beyond the individual's control. If the pro-
cedures against witnesses involve an imposition of severe restrictions
on liberty, the state will be defeating its own objective. Instead of en-
couraging its citizens to be responsible and volunteer information which
the state is seeking, it will make them reluctant to come forward and
incur the severe consequences of being a witness. Admittedly, many
witnesses are not "innocent" respectable citizens, but "a scheme of
ordered liberty" 219 cannot rest on the basis of imposing restrictions on
all in order to deter a few.
218 Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1966). The state cannot make
a crime out of any behavior it wishes.
219 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
